RPC to self with rendez-vous leading to duplicate port destroy
IRC, freenode, #hurd, 2011-03-14
<antrik> youpi: I wonder, why does the root FS call diskfs_S_dir_lookup()
at all?...
<youpi> errr, because a client asked for it?
<youpi> (problem with RPCs is you can't easily know where they come from :)
)
<youpi> (especially when it's the root fs...)
<antrik> ah, it's about a client request... didn't see that
<youpi> well, I just said "is called", yes
<antrik> I do not really understand though why it tries to reauthenticate
against itself...
<antrik> I fear my memory of the lookup mechanism grew a bit dim
<youpi> see the source
<youpi> it's about a translated entry
<antrik> (and I never fully understood some aspects anyways...)
<youpi> it needs to start the translated entry as another user, possibly
<antrik> yes, but a translated entry normally would be served by *another*
process?...
<youpi> sure, but ext2fs has to prepare it
<youpi> thus reauthenticate to prepare the correct set of rights
<antrik> prepare what?
<youpi> rights
<youpi> so the process is not root, doesn't have / opened as root, etc.
<antrik> rights for what?
<youpi> err, about everything
<antrik> IIRC the reauthentication is done by the parent FS on the port to
the *translated* node
<antrik> and the translated node should be a different process?...
<youpi> that's not what I read in the source
<youpi> fshelp_fetch_root
<youpi> ports[INIT_PORT_CRDIR] = reauth (getcrdir ());
<youpi> here, getcrdir() returns ext2fs itself
<antrik> well, perhaps the issue is that I have no idea what
fshelp_fetch_root() does, nor why it is called here...
<youpi> it notably starts the translator that dir_lookup is looking at, if
needed
<youpi> possibly as a different user, thus reauthentication of CRDIR
<antrik> so this is about a port that is passed to the translator being
started?
<youpi> no
<youpi> well, depends on what you mean by "port"
<youpi> it's about reauthenticating a port to be passed to the translator
being started
<youpi> and for that a rendez-vous port is needed for the reauthentication
<youpi> and that's the one at stake
<antrik> yeah, I meant the port that is reauthenticated
<antrik> what is CRDIR?
<youpi> current root dir ...
<antrik> so the parent translator passes it's own root dir to the child
translator; and the issue is that for the root FS the root dir points to
the root FS itself...
<youpi> yes
<antrik> OK, that makes sense
<youpi> (but that's only one example, rgrep mach_port_destroy hurd/ show
other potential issues)
<antrik> well, that's actually what I wanted to mention next... why is the
rendez-vous port destroyed, instead of just deallocating the port right
and letting reference counting to it's thing?...
<antrik> do its thing
<youpi> "just to make sure" I guess
<antrik> it's pretty obvious that this will cause trouble for any RPC
referencing itself...
<youpi> well, follow-up with that on the list
<youpi> with roland/tb in CC
<youpi> only they would know any real reason for destroy
<youpi> btw, if you knew how we could make _hurd_select()'s raw __mach_msg
call be interruptible by signals, that'll permit to fix sudo
<youpi> (damn, I need sleep, my tenses are all wrong)
<antrik> BTW, does this cause any actual trouble?...
<antrik> I don't know much about interruption... cfhammer might have a
better idea, he look into that stuff quite a bit AIUI
<antrik> looked
<antrik> (hehe, it's not only your tenses... guess there's something in the
ether ;-) )
<youpi> it makes sudo, mailq, etc. fail sometimes
<antrik> I mean the rendez-vous thing
<youpi> that's it, yes
<youpi> sudo etc. fail at least due to this
<antrik> so these are two different problems that both affect sudo?
<antrik> (rendez-vous and interruption I mean)
<youpi> yes
<youpi> with my patch the buildds have much fewer issues, but still some
<youpi> (my interrupt-related patch)
<youpi> I'm installing a s/destroy/deallocate/ version of ext2fs on the
buildds, we'll see how it behaves
<youpi> (it fixes my testcase at least)
<antrik> interrupt-related patch?
<antrik> only thing interrupt-related I remember was the reauthentication
race...
<youpi> that's what I mean
<antrik> well, cfhammer investigated this is quite some depth, explaining
quite well why the race is only mitigated but still exists... problem is
that we didn't know how to fix it properly
<antrik> because nobody seems to understand the cancellation code, except
perhaps for Roland and Thomas
<antrik> (and I'm not even entirely sure about them :-) )
<antrik> I think his findings and our conclusions are documented on the
ML...
<youpi> by "much fewer issues", I mean that some of the symptoms have
disappeared, others haven't
<antrik> BTW, couldn't the rendez-vous thing be worked around by simply
ignoring the errors from the failing deallocate?...
<youpi> no, failing deallocate are actually dangerous
<antrik> why?
<youpi> since the name might have been reused for something else in the
meanwhile
<youpi> that's the whole point of the warning I had added in the kernel
itself
<antrik> I see
<youpi> such things really deserve tracking, since they can have any kind
of consequence
<antrik> does Mach try to reuse names quickly, rather than only after
wrapping around?...
<youpi> it seems to
<antrik> OK, then this is a serious problem indeed
<youpi> (note: I rarely divine issues when there aren't actual frequent
symptoms :) )
<antrik> well, the problem with the warning is that it only shows in the
cases that do *not* cause a problem... so it's hard to associate them
with any specific issues
<youpi> well, most of the time the port is not reused quickly enough
<youpi> so in most case it shows up more often than causing problem
IRC, freenode, #hurd, 2011-03-14
<youpi> ok, mach_port_deallocate actually can't be used
<youpi> since mach_reply_port() returns a receive right, not a send right
* youpi guesses he will really have to manage to understand all that port
stuff completely
<antrik> oh, right
<antrik> youpi: hm... now I'm confused though. if one client holds a
receive right, the other client (or in this case the same process) should
have a send or send-once right -- these should *not* share the same name
in my understanding
<antrik> destroying the receive right should turn the send right into a
dead name
<antrik> so unless I'm missing something, the destroy shouldn't be a
problem, and there must be something else going wrong
<antrik> hm... actually I'm probably wrong
<antrik> yeah, definitely wrong. receive rights and "ordinary" send rights
share the name. only send-once rights are special
<antrik> I wonder whether the problem could be worked around by using a
send-once right...
<antrik> mach_port_mod_refs(mach_task_self(), name,
MACH_PORT_RIGHT_RECEIVE, -1) can be used to deallocate only the receive
right
<antrik> oh, you already figured that out :-)